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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2 as this matter is 
an appeal from a final Judgment and Order in a civil matter from 
the Third Judicial District Court In and Fpr Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the authority contained in the 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(4) in an Orc^ er dated January 15, 
1988. This is a consolidated appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASff 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from Findings Of Fapt And Conclusions Of 
Law And Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable District Court Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson presiding, ordering Judgment for Defendant-
Respondent and assessing costs against Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEblNGS 
On September 11, 1987 the Court entered its Amended 
Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, and Judgment. On October 8, 
1987 the Honorable Judge Hanson entered an Order extending the 
time for filing a Notice of Appeal for Appellant Ronald K. 
Neilsen, dba, Marina Mechanics Enterprises, hereinafter referred 
to as "Neilsen" to November 9, 1987, upon such date "Neilsen 
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filed his appeal Appellant Astro Steel Corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Astro" filed its Notice of Appeal on October 9, 
1987. The cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals and 
Consolidated by Order of the Court. Extensions were granted in 
which to file required documents thereafter, including the briefs 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action appealed from arises out of the construction of 
a marina on Callville Bay, Lake Mead, Nevada. The Defenfdant-
Respondent, Forever Living Products, hereinafter referred to as 
"FLP", is the owner. Marinas Internationale, hereinafter referred 
to as "MI", not a party to the action due to a Chapter 11, 
converted to a Chapter 7 in Virginia, was the general contractor, 
becoming such on or about December 14, 1984. (see Record on 
Appeal, page numbers 000606-000615, pg. 000608, para. 5). 
On or about March 1, 1985 "MI" entered into an 
"Installation Contract" with "Neilsen". (see Record on Appeal, 
page numbers 000606-000615, pg. 000608, para. 8). Other pertinent 
facts relative to this appeal are as set forth in the Record on 
Appeal, page numbers 000606-000615. 
Other pertinent, material facts not set forth in the 
Record on Appeal, page numbers 000606-000615 are as follows: 
(a) "Astro" was a materialman only and had no direct 
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contractual obligations to either "MI" or "#LP". (see Transcript 
dated June 10, 1987, hereinafter referred to as Tr. 2, pages 135-
147). 
(b) "Astro1s" contract was with "Neilsen" only and was to 
supply steel structural material only, and such contract was 
entered into after "Neilsen" contracted with "MI", (see Tr. 2, 
pages 135-147). 
(c) The contract between "FLP" and "MI" and the contract 
between "FLP" and "Neilsen" both contemplated third-party 
beneficiaries, (see Record on Appeal, page numbers 000606-00615). 
(d) The Complaint in Intervention o£ "Astro" clearly sets 
forth a claim in negligence for the negligent payilfcnt to "MI" by 
"FLP". (see Record on Appeal, page numbers 000096-000102, 
specifically page 000098, para. 8). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal in behalf of "Astro" are 
as follows: 
(a) Whether "Astro" was damaged by the negligence of 
"FLP", other than economically, in "FLP's" administration of its 
contract, and consequently, whether the Hbnorable Judge Hanson 
erred in his dismissal of the negligence cause of action pursuant 
to Defendant-Respondent's Rule 41B motion, (see Ruling of Judge 
Hanson dated June 16, 1987). 
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(b) Whether "Astro", as a materialman only, "steps into 
the shoes" of the contractor, or subcontractor, and is subject to 
all defenses "FLP" could raise as against a contractor or 
subcontractor, and consequently, whether the Honorable Judge 
Hanson erred in his ruling that granted no cause of action on 
"Astrofs" third-party beneficiary theory. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
Appellant "Astro" adduced evidence at trial, prior to 
Judge Hanson's ruling on Defendant's Rule 41B Motion, that 
sustains a finding that "FLP" was negligent in the making of 
payments to the contractor, "MI". Such payments were in breach of 
a duty to intended third-party beneficiaries contemplated under 
the "FLP"/"MI" contract, and such breach was the proximate cause 
of damage to "Astro" in other than economic ways. The most 
significant non-economic injury/damage to "Astro" was the loss of 
its bonding capacity as a result of "FLP's" failure to retain 
payment until verification of delivery of materials to site was 
made. As a direct and proimate result of "FLP's" failure to 
properly make payments on the contract to "MI", "Astro" was a 
defendant in a lawsuit and consequent judgment from the supplier 
of the steel materials that "Astro" delivered to "FLP's" site. 
That judgment, because "Astro" did not receive the money to pay 
over to their supplier, caused "Astro" to lose its contractor's 
bond with the resultant loss of business, inability to bid the 
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normal kinds of jobs they had been bidding, with resultant loss 
in profits. Judge Hanson's Rule 41B Motion Ruling on the 
negligence issue cut short the ability of "Astro" to present 
evidence of those lost profits and effect of loss of bonding. 
"Astro" believes that the Complaint in Intervention clearly sets 
forth a negligence claim for negligent payment by "FLP". The 
Honorable Judge Hanson's Ruling, based upon his reading of the 
Complaint in Intervention that there was not a cause set forth 
for negligent payment, precluded "Astro" from further presenting 
non-economic loss evidence. Such Ruling was an error, and the 
I 
case should be remanded for further evidence on the negligent 
payment issue. 
ARGUMENT II 
Appellant "Astro" was a materialman only, providing 
materials to the job site and nothing more. A legal distinction 
in the cases on third-party beneficiary is drawn between 
subcontractors and materialmen, where the materialmen provide 
only materials and no subcontract work or labor. Materialmen, in 
cases such as this, do not "step into the shoes" of the 
contractor or subcontractor for all purposes. "Astro" believes 
the Honorable Judge Hanson erred in the law as to third-party 
beneficiary under the circumstances of this case by failing to 
acknowledge the distinction in the law regarding materialmen who 
provide only materials. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
"Astro" lost its bonding capacity as a direct result of 
the "FLP's" failure to adhere to its contractual provisions of 
withholding payments to "MI" until after materials were verified 
as delivered to the construction site, (see "MI"/"FLP" contract, 
D-40, paragraphs 20.1 and 23 regarding payments to 
subcontractors/materialment; also see Transcript dated June 11, 
1987, hereinafter referred to as Tr. 3, page 151, lines 19-25, 
page 152, lines 1-14). 
The issue of lost bonding capacity is directly related 
to "FLP's" negligent payment of contract amounts to "MI" before 
the verifications of completion and delivers were accomplished by 
"FLP". "FLP" had a duty to materialmen to make payments to "MI" 
only as scheduled in the contract between "FLP" and "MI", (see D-
40; see also Tr. 2, page 128, lines 23-25, pages 129-134; see 
also Tr. 2, page 136, lines 20-25). 
There was a definite obligation and duty imposed by the 
contract (D-40) upon "FLP" to make payments to the contractor in 
a specif manner, (see D-40, sections 20.1 and section 23). 
Astro", not a party to the contract, was damaged, non-
economically, by "FLP's" breach of those contractual provisions 
on payment that created a duty of due care toward third-party 
beneficiaries such as "Astro". As a direct and proximate result 
of "FLP's" breach of duty to "Astro", "Astro" ended up being a 
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Judgment debtor to their supplier and consequently lost their 
bonding capacity which precluded "Astro" from even bidding the 
types of jobs they had previously been able to bid when they had 
their bond. The loss of the bond itself is a non-economic injury 
resulting directly from "FLP's" failure to adhere to the 
safeguards for payment set forth in "FLP's" contract with "MI". 
The fact of the matter is that "FLP" paid out the full contract 
amount to "MI" without verifying deliveries of materials or 
adhereing to the contractual safeguards that would have protected 
"Astro", (see Transcript dated June 16, 1987, hereinafter 
referred to as Tr. 4, page 165, lines 19-25, pages 166-176 to 
line 22). It is further clear from the testimony of Mr. Tom Mace, 
employee of "FLP" and the only person authorized to make 
payments, that Mr. Mace approved payments to "MI" without regard 
for the duty of verified payemnts to protect "Astro" and other 
parties not parties to the "FLP"/"MI" contract. It is also clear 
that Mr. Mace approved the final, full contract amount payment to 
"MI" when the marina was only about 30% completed, (see Tr. 4, 
page 186, lines 8-19, page 204, lines 17-25, page 205, lines 1-
4). 
The negligent payment issue is a cause of action in 
negligence when the contractual provisions establish a duty owed 
to someone not a party to the contract. All that need be shown to 
give a basis for the negligence action is to find the duty. This 
is true even though the relationship comes out of a contractual 
relationship, (see W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 4th Ed. 1971, 
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Section 93; D.C.R., Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company, 663 P. 2d 433 
(Utah 1983); Meece v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720 
(Utah 1981); and, Williams v. City of North Las Veags, 541 P.2d 
652 (Nev. 1975). Once the duty is established, the plaintiff must 
proceed to prove the breach of duty, proximate cause, and 
damages. 
Judge Hanson did not allow "Astro" to present further 
evidence on the negligent payment issue as a result of his Rule 
41B ruling. Judge Hanson made his Rule 41B ruling based upon his 
erronious belief that there was no cause of action stated for 
negligent payment, (see Judge Hanson's Ruling dated June 16, 
1987, Record on Appeal page number 000647), even though the 
Complaint in Intervention clearly sets forth the negligent 
payment cause, (see Record on Appeal, Complaint in Intervention, 
page numbers 000096 through 000101, specifically, page 000098, 
paragraph 8; see also, Record on Appeal, Intervener's Trial 
Brief, pages 000474 through 000479). 
Judge Hanson erred in dismissing the negligence cause 
based both on his erronious conclusion that there was not a cause 
stated for negligent payment and that there were no non-economic 
damages stated by "Astro". 
ARGUMENT 
II 
The general rule in third-party beneficiary law in both 
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Nevada and Utah is that third-party beneficiaries are subject to 
the defenses that would be available as between the parties to 
the contract* (see Britton v. Groom, 373 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1962). 
The Nevada Court cited the Britton case in Morelli v. Morelli, 
720 P. 2d 704 (Nev. 1986) and determined that that general rule 
is not always applicable. The Morelli case was a domestic 
relations case wherein a child, upon reaching majority, could 
enforce a contract as a third-party beneficiary even though the 
father asserted a defense based upon the former wife's non-
performance. The former wife had passed away. The Court 
determined that since the former wife was dead, it was impossible 
for her to perform under the contract. Morelli thus held that the 
general rule of the third-party beneficiary stepping into the 
shoes of the parties to the contract is not applicable in all 
cases. If the third-party beneficiary, or the original party to 
the contract couldn't perform or it was impossible for those 
parties to perform under the contract, the general rule cannot 
apply. 
In the instant case "Astro" couldn't perform because it 
was a materialman only and had no expertise, knowledge or license 
to complete the contract, i.e., build the jroarina. "Astro merely 
supplied a small portion of the materials required to build the 
marina. Further it is obvious from the testimony of Milt Taylor, 
"Astrofs" president, that he was not under any time frame for 
delivery of the steel product and did not even know of any time 
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frame set forth in the "FLP"/"MI" contract as he was not a party 
to it nor in privity with "FLP" or "MI" concerning the contract, 
"Astro" was merely a third-party beneficiary to the payment 
provisions of the "FLP"/"MI" contract. 
"FLP" misconstrues the meaning of material breach when 
it suggests that "Mi's" material breach relieves it of 
performance. (see Lagrange Construction, Inc. v. Kent 
Corporation, 429 P.2d 58, 59 (Nev. 1967); and, Cladianos v. 
Friedhoff, 240 P.2d 208, (Nev. 1952). The real issue on breach is 
that "FLP" failed to properly verify payments to "MI" in breach 
of its contractual obligation and contractually created duty to 
"Astro" when it made full contractual payment to "MI" prior to 
the project being completed, or more importantly to "Astro", 
before "Astro had even delivered the last load of steel product 
to the site. This "FLP" breach was a material breach that 
occurred before any material by "MI" and "FLP's" breach precluded 
"Astro" from getting paid. 
The law in Nevada is liberal in allowing recovery to 
third-party beneficiaries under third-party beneficiary theory, 
(see "Astrofs" Trial Brief, Record on Appeal, page numbers 000451 
through 000484, specifically, pages 000455 through 000463). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The facts, through testimony and exhibits, adduced at 
trial, before the Honorable Judge Hanson's Rule 41B ruling, 
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illustrate that "Astro" had plead and started to prove the 
elements of a negligence cause of action based upon "FLP's" 
negligent payment of contract funds to the general contractor, 
"MI", prior to verified completion. (The project being only about 
30% completed when Mr. Mace of "FLP" authorized payment of the 
full contract amount to "MI"). The Honorable Judge Hanson erred 
by dismissing the negligence cause of "Astto" in his ruling of 
June 16, 1987 on "FLP's" Ru;e 41B Motion. 
The case should be remanded to the District Court on 
the issue of negligent payment as plead by "Astro". "Astro" 
should be allowed to finish aducing evidehce to establish its 
cause of action in negligence. 
The Honorable Judge Hanson ruled in his July 1, 1987 
Ruling that "Astro" proved its case on third-party beneficiary 
theory but that all damages proved were dffset because of the 
defenses available to "FLP". Judge Hanson erred in his 
application of the law of third-party beneficiary, as "Astro" is 
not subject to all the defenses "FLP" might have against "MI". 
"Astro", as only a materialman, does not have the ability to 
complete the marina, thus making it an impossibility to perform 
as the general contractor should have performed. In such factual 
situations the third-party beneficiary does not step into the 
shoes of the contractor for all purposes. "Astro" did not pick 
and choose the provisions of the contract (the "FLP"/MI" 
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contract) that it felt beneficial to it, but rather choose to 
enforce its limited third-party rights as provided under the 
contract. Those limited rights were established by "FLP" and 
benefitted were designed to benefit, in this case, "Astro" only 
with regard to payment assurances. 
"Astro" respectfully represents that the trial 
court's ruling of no cause based upon the offsets as applied to 
"Astro" should be reversed and Judgment entered for "Astro" in 
the amount of $101,300.00 as supported by the evidence, together 
with prejudgment interest, as set forth in the Record on Appeal, 
page numbers 000606 through 000614, specifically page 000611 
paragraph 23. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 1988. 
f J. Ray Barria&, PTC. 
y Attorney for{Astro Steel Corporation 
V_Piaantiff/In"c:^rvenor-Appellant 
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